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RECENT BOOKS
BooK R.Evrnws
TENDER OFFERS FOR CORPORATE CONTROL. By Edward Ross
Aranow and Herbert A. Einhorn. New York: Columbia University
Press. 1973. Pp. xiii, 352. $40.

Tender Offers for Corporate Control is a most topical addition
to the growing list of specialized securities regulation treatises. Prior
to 1960, the American method of changing corporate control was
the proxy fight. In the sixties, however, the bull market, easy money,
and the conglomerate craze combined to popularize the cash takeover bid or-as it is frequently called-the tender offer. By 1966,
corporations were making more than 100 takeover bids a year,1 and
an annual aggregate of more than 1,000,000,000 dollars was involved.2 The cash takeover had arrived. Management was threatened.
Senator Harrison Williams of New Jersey rose to the occasion.
In October 1965, the Williams bill3 was introduced. Its stated purpose was to protect management from industrial sabotage resulting
from reckless corporate raids on proud old companies.4 By the time
of its enactment in July 1968, however, the Williams bill was intended to do more than defend entrenched management. The House
Report stated that the bill "avoids tipping the balance of regulation either in favor of management or in favor of the person making
the takeover bid. It is designed to require full and fair disclosure
for the benefit of investors while at the same time providing the
offeror and management equal opportunity to fairly present their
case."5
The Williams Act6 added five new provisions to the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934: sections 13(d), 13(e), 14(d), 14(e), and 14(f).7
In general, the new provisions regulate the terms on which tender
offers can be made, require specific disclosures by potential offerors
and similar disclosures by purchasers within ten days after acquisition of five per cent8 of any class of registered equity securities,
proscribe fraud in connection with tender offers, authorize SEC rule!. H.R. REP. No. 1711, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1968).
2. See 113 CONG. REc. 24664-65 (1967) (remarks of Sen. Williams).
3. 5. 2731, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965).
4. Ill CoNG. REc. 28257-60 (1965) (remarks of Sen. Williams).
5. H.R. REP. No. 1711, supra note I, at 4.
6. Act of July 29, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-439, 82 Stat. 454.
7. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)-(e), 78n(d}-(f) (1970).
8. A 1970 amendment reduced this figure from 10 per cent, as originally enacted.
Act of Dec. 22, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-567, 84 Stat. 1497, amending Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, § 13(d), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (1970).
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making with respect to the repurchase by corporations of their own
securities, and require proxy-statement-type disclosure in connection
with a change of a majority of the directors following a tak.eover.9
Aranow and Einhorn, practitioners with broad experience in
tender offers and proxy fights and authors of Proxy Contests for
Corporate Control, 10 have written a treatise that covers substantially
all of the questions involved in a tender offer. The practical is interspersed with the legal in a well-coordinated pattern. The financial
and market considerations necessary to identify an appropriate
target and determine whether and at what price it is vulnerable to a
takeover bid are discussed in summary form. The tender-offer team
of fawyer, investment banker, dealer-manager, professional proxysoliciting firm, public relations man, and depository bank are identified and their roles explained. The essential position of arbitrageurs
in tender offers is treated in a chapter prepared with the assistance
of a partner of one of the leading arbitrage firms. There is also a
comprehensive discussion of tactics to use in defense against a
takeover bid.
The core of the book is a detailed discussion of the provisions
9. Section 14(d), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d) (1970), requires a "person" (defined to include a
"group" acting in concert) making a tender offer that would result in the offeror's
ownership of more than five per cent of the shares of the target company to disclose
concurrently the offeror's identity and background; the source and amount of the funds
to be used to pay for the tendered shares; if the purpose of the tender is control of
the target; any plans for liquidation, merger, or other major change in the business or
corporate structure of the target; the number of shares the offeror presently owns;
and any contracts or understandings with other persons with respect to any securities
of the target. In addition to requiring disclosure, section 14(d) substantively regulates
tender offers by requiring that (1) tendering shareholders be permitted to withdraw
tendered shares during the first seven days of the offer or after sixty days if the
offeror has not purchased or returned the shares by then, thereby providing an opportunity for tendering shareholders to change their minds after reflection and preventing
indefinite lockups; (2) if more shares are tendered than are to be purchased, the
offeror purchase on a pro rata basis from among all shares tendered during the first
ten days of the offer, thereby preventing a first-come-first-served stampede by shareholders anxious to have their shares accepted; and (3) any increase in the tender price
be paid to all tendering shareholders, including those accepted at the lower price,
thereby assuring equal treatment of all shareholders.
Section 13(d), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (1970), requires the same disclosure of identity,
financing, purpose, holdings, and understandings by any person (again including a
"group") who acquires more than five per cent of the shares of a corporation. The
disclosure must be made within ten days after the five per cent threshold is reached.
The purpose of this requirement is to alert the corporation, its shareholders, and the
market in general to the fact of the acquisition and the purchaser's plans.
Section 14(e), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1970), is a general antifraud provision. It proscribes material misstatements, misleading omissions, and fraudulent or manipulative
acts in connection with a tender offer.
The SEC rulemaking authority with respect to repurchase of stocks by a corporation
is contained in section 13(e), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(e) (1970).
Section 14(£), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(f) (1970), deals with planned changes in boards of
directors following takeovers.
10. E • .ARANOW &: H. EINHORN, PROXY CONTESTS FOR CORPORATE CONTROL (1957) (2d
ed. 1968).
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of the Williams Act and the SEC regulations with respect to tender
offers. The principal issues are raised; the legislative history, court
decisions, and SEC interpretations are noted.
Unfortunately for the reader, the book's August 31, 1972, cutoff
date results in the omission of the bumper crop of 1973 tender offer
cases. A series of 1973 decisions have made the Williams Act an
almost impossible barrier to contested takeovers. The courts have
now done what Congress refused to do; they have made the Williams Act a shield for entrenched management against "reckless corporate raids on proud old companies." The Act, as recently construed, will bar contested takeovers whether or not management has
performed well and whether or not a majority of the shareholders
wish to accept the offer. The 1973 decisions have been recognized by
Wall Street. Arbitrageurs now sit back until they see the target's
defensive team, particularly the lawyer. If the target is determined
and represented by counsel experienced in takeover defense, the
arbitrageurs will not buy to tender and a major battle of the takeover
war is thus lost at the outset. Indeed, one member of the New York
Bar has become so renowned for his successful defense against takeovers that the first question on Wall Street is which side has him.
As Aranow and Einhorn recognize, the key to takeover defense
under the Williams Act is the requirement that the offeror disclose
the purpose of the offer and that there be no material misstatement
or misleading omission in such disclosure. However, as the book
necessarily fails to convey, this year's decisions, particularly in the
Second Circuit, have given such a broad sweep to this requirement
that one must doubt the practicality of the takeover bid as a means
of changing control. Injunctions have been issued for failure to disclose that an offeror, ostensibly seeking only twenty per cent of the
target and disclaiming all but investment intent, had a history of
expanding minority interests into complete acquisition; 11 for failure
to disclose that the acquisition of shares of the target might be an
antitrust violation; 12 for failure to disclose that the purchase of the
target's stock pursuant to the tender offer might reduce the stock's
float to the point where sfock exchange delisting would be considered;13 for failure to disclose a possible intention to use the liquid
assets of the target, inferred from the offeror's action in an unrelated
acquisition three years earlier; 14 for failure to disclose that a foreigncontrolled offeror might be required under the laws of its parent's
11. Gulf 8: Western Indus., Inc. v. Great Atl. 8: Pac. Tea Co,, 476 F.2d 687 (2d Cir.
1973).
12. Gulf &: Western Indus., Inc. v. Great Atl. &: Pac. Tea Co., 476 F.2d 687 (2d Cir.
1973).
13. Sonesta Intl. Hotels Corp. v. Wellington Associates, CCH FED. SEC, L. REP.
11 94,041 (2d Cir. 1973).
14. General Host Corp. v, Triumph Am,, Inc., 359 F,Supp. 749 (S.D.N.Y. 1973),

December 1973]

Recent Books

361

domicile to follow certain dividend and investment policies; 15 for
failure to disclose an offeror's financial position where that information was not publicly available and the offeror sought control
through acquisition of less than all shares and contemplated a merger with the target; 16 and for failure to disclose the amount of a
judgment won by the target against the offeror, despite disclosure of
the dispute.17 Injunctions have also been granted because of an
offeror's late filing under section 13(d).18 This spate of 1973 decisions must be read and understood to complete the tender offer picture sketched as of August 1972 by Aranow and Einhorn.19
The need for an early supplement to Tender Offers for Corporate
Control is highlighted by the necessary omission of the 1973 landmark decision of the Second Circuit in Chris-Craft Industries v. Piper
Aircraft Corporation.20 The contest between Chris-Craft and Bangor
15. General Host Corp. v. Triumph Am., Inc., 359 F. Supp. 749 (S.D.N.Y. 1973). See
also Ronson Corp. v. Liquifin Aktiengesellschaft, CCH Fm,. SEC. L. REP. ,r 94,088 (3d
Cir. 1973).
16. Corenco Corp. v. Schiavone &: Sons, Inc., 362 F. Supp. 939 (S.D.N.Y.), a/fd.,
CCH Fm,. SEc. L. REP. ,r 94,196 (2d Cir. 1973). In this case the offeror was permitted to
revise its disclosures to comply with the injunction, republish, and continue the offer,
giving previous tenderors the option to withdraw. The Second Circuit, recognizing the
effects of the earlier decisions, rejected the argument that nondeliberate section 14(e)
disclosure violations should be punished by disqualification of the offeror. For the
offeror who is not precluded by market or financing considerations from continuing its
offer, this represents a tipping of the scale back toward evenhanded treatment of
offeror and target.
17. Sonesta Intl. Hotels Corp. v. Wellington Associates, CCH FED. SEC, L. REP.
,r 94,041 (2d Cir. 1973).
18. Water & Wall Associates, Inc. v. American Consumer Indus., CCH Fm,. SEc. L.
REP. ,r 94,943 (D.N.J. 1973). Cf. Mosinee Paper Corp. v. Rondeau, CCH Fm,. SEC. L.
REP. ,I 93,971 (W.D. Wis. 1973).
19. A very recent decision creates even more uncertainty. In Texasgulf, Inc. v.
Canada Dev. Corp., CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. ,r 94,160 (S.D. Tex. 1973), the court
rejected, after a hearing on the facts, Texasgulf's (target) claims that Canada Development Corporation violated sections 14(d) and 14(e) by failing to disclose (I) that the
acquisition of shares of the target might be an antitrust violation; (2) that the acquisition of shares of the target might be in violation of the state corporation statutes;
(3) that the acquisition of shares of the target might be in violation of the Federal
Communications Act, and thereby result in loss of valuable communciation assets;
(4) the conflict of interest existing between target and tender offeror; (5) the plans for
management changes and possible disposition of target's assets; (6) that the acquisition
of shares of the target might result in adverse effects to target's overseas operations;
(7) that the acquisition of shares of the target would cause target to become ineligible
for certain insurance, finance, and other programs offered in connection with investments in less developed countries; and (8) the identity of persons allegedly acting in
concert with it. The case is of particular interest for the court's approval of amended
offering document disclosure to "cure" prior "defects."
For an interesting opinion on determining the status of a tender offer as a contract,
see Lowenschuss v. Berry, 73 Civ. 2021 (S.D.N.Y., July 1973), in which the court held
that a tender offer "is ••• a solicitation of offers from the tendering parties or in other
words an 'offer for an offer' "; and that, assuming that a tender offer constitutes a
contract, if the tender offer is enjoined for violation of section 14(e) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, performance of the contract would be impossible, and, therefore,
there would be no breach of contract.
20. (1972-1973 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC, L. REP. 193,816 (2d Cir. 1973).
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Punta to take over Piper Aircraft Corporation is a classic in terms
of the strategems employed by the contestants and the multitude of
legal issues raised in the three-way takeover war. While the book discusses the earlier cases in the Piper War, its 1972 cutoff date omits
this latest opinion, which encompasses the earlier skirmishes and
reverses a number of the lower court holdings discussed in the book.
In addition to holding that the defeated offeror may bring a damage
action against the management of the target, the competing offeror,
and the underwriter for the competing offeror for their Williams
Act violations, the Second Circuit opinion establishes the standards
of materiality, disclosure, and due diligence that are to be applied
under the Act. The opinion also sustains the right of the SEC to
obtain the ancillary relief of a rescission order, on behalf of tendering shareholders, against offerors who have violated the antifraud
provisions of the federal securities laws.
Although the book is comprehensive with regard to pre-1973 law,
one topic treated summarily, and to this reader unsatisfactorily, by
Aranow and Einhorn is the so-called "creeping tender offer" theory
-the integration of the purchases of the target's stock made before
the announcement of the formal tender offer with the formal tender
offer so as to make the early purchases violations of the Williams
Act. The authors reject the theory categorically. They also deny
that the federal securities laws require an offeror to disclose its intent to make a future tender offer before making open-market purchases: "The laws could hardly be otherwise unless one were willing
to accept the ludicrous result of requiring every investor that intended to make substantial purchases of a security to disclose such
intention prior to its initial purchase" (p. 73).
While existing precedent supports the Aranow and Einhorn position on creeping tender offers, the argument to the contrary cannot
be so lightly dismissed. Indeed, in a case where the prior determination to make a tender offer is clearly established, it would not be
surprising to see a court reach the opposite result and, for Williams
Act purposes, integrate preannouncement open-market purchases
with the formal offer.21 Once a tender offer has been made both the
21. Compare Gulf & Western Indus., Inc. v. Great Atl. &: Pac. Tea Co., 356 F. Supp.
1066 (S.D.N.Y.), afjd., 476 F.2d 687 (2d Cir. 1973); General Host Corp. v. Triumph
Am., Inc., 359 F. Supp. 749 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (rejecting the argument that pre-formal
announcement purchases of less than five per cent of the shares of the target require
Williams Act disclosure) and Texasgulf, Inc. v. Canada Dev. Corp., CCH FED. SEC,
L. REP. 1f 94,160 (S.D. Tex. 1973) ("Thus, it is evident that CDC's [Canada Devel•
opment Corporation] undisclosed purchase and conscious avoidance of the 5% trigger•
ing requirement, whether alone or together with Noranda, are not a violation of the
law." ,r 94,160, at 94,684.) with Griffith & Tucker, The Williams Act, Public Law 90-439
-Growing Pains? Some Interpretations with Respect to the Williams Act, 16 How.
L.J. 654, 700-01 (1971): the integration theory underlying the SEC staff position in its
interpretative letter with respect to Cattlemen's Inv. Co. [1971-1972 Transfer Binder]
CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 1[ 78,775 Gan. 4, 1972) and Cattlemen's Inv. Co. v. Fears, 343
F. Supp. 1248 (W.D. Okla. 1972) (holding that the legislative history of the Williams
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Williams Act and rule IOb-13 22 require equality of treatment of
shareholders. Arguably, the policy considerations underlying these
provisions are equally applicable to the shareholders who sell the
first five per cent of the target's stock to the offeror. Acceptance of
these policy considerations would require integration of the preannouncement purchases with the tender offer.
The creeping tender offer also raises the question whether rule
IOb-5 23 requires disclosure of the prospective offeror's intentions
before it makes purchases in the open market. 24 This issue is not
adequately considered in the book.25 Unfortunately, there is no direct
precedent on this question. Nor is there any direct precedent on
the related question whether, apart from the intention to make a
formal tender offer in the future, the immediate intention to engage
in a substantial buying program, at prices contemplated to be in
excess of the current market price or in a market situation where
the buying program may reasonably be expected to result in higher
prices, in and of itself requires disclosure.
The answer to these questions is rooted in the answer to the more
fundamental question of whether rule IOb-5 requires-or should require-that the parties to a securities transaction, under all circumstances, inform each other of all nonpublic material facts of which
they know. In short, does rule I0b-5 require parity of information
for all market participants?26 It seems clear that the objective of a
Act establishes the congressional intent that the Williams Act cover other techniques
for accumulating large blocks as well as conventional tender offers). See also Water &:
Wall Associates, Inc. v. American Consumer Indus., CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 'If 93,943
(D.N.J. 1973) (rejecting, without consideration of the arguments, open-market purchases
for the purpose of control as constituting a tender offer); Mosinee Paper Corp. v.
Rondeau, CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 'If 93,971, at 93,888 (W.D. Wis. 1973) (questioning
whether a series of open-market purchases exceeding in the aggregate five per cent
should be construed as a tender offer).
22. 17 C.F.R. § 240.IO(b)-13 (1973).
23. 17 C.F.R. § 240.IO(b)-5 (1973).
24. The SEC releases on rule IOb-13 show that the SEC contemplated that nondisclosure of intent to make a tender offer after open-market purchases could be a
violation of rule lOb-5 and other antifraud and antimanipulation provisions. In SEC
Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8595, at 2 (May 5, 1969), (1969-1970 Transfer
Binder] CCH F.ED. SEC. L. REP. 'If 77,706, at 83,617, proposing rule lOb-13, the SEC said:
"Such pre-tender purchases, of course, would be subject to the provisions of Rule IOb-5
under the Act." In SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8712, at 2 (Oct. 8, 1969),
(1969-1970 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 'If 77,745, at 83,709, adopting rule
lOb-13, the SEC said: "Of course, the general anti-fraud and anti-manipulation provisions could apply to such pre-tender purchases."
25. If disclosure of preannouncement open-market purchases is required by rule
I0b-5 or the other antifraud provisions, such disclosure would presumably tip the
balance on the tender offer definition question. The SEC staff has taken the position
that announcement of a tender offer to be made in the future starts the tender offer
period and triggers the applicability of rule lOb-13. United Brands Co., (1972-1973
Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 'If 79,268 (Dec. 19, 1972); Allied Prods. Corp.,
CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 'If 79,375 (March 21, 1973).
26. The basic question as recently posed by the SEC is, "whether and to what extent
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normally functioning market should override the parity-of-information principle when normal accumulations of investment position
selected, nonpublic knowledge about the existing or future market in particular securities should be treated as material information which must be disclosed by securities
professionals or other persons prior to any transactions in those securities." SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 10316 (Aug. 1, 1973), CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 11 79,446, at
83,263. In Fleischer, Mundheim & Murphy, An Initial Inquiry into the Responsibility to
Disclose Market Information, 121 U. PA. L. REv. 798, 818 (1973), the authors reach the
conclusion that the parity-of-information approach is too restrictive: it would depart
significantly "from an underlying assumption of a competitive economy that it is
desirable, on the whole, to reward the diligent who have acquired a superior market
position." As an alternative the authors suggest a fairness test, which "would permit
the user of material, nonpublic information to show that his exploitation of that
information represented a legitimate reward for the economic effort by him or the
person who provided him the information," but they conclude that even this would be
too restrictive and adhere instead to a test based on a special relationship between the
parties and an independent duty to disclose. Dicta in recent cases, the theory under•
lying recent SEC complaints, the broad sweep given to rule I0b-5 by the Supreme
Court in Superintendent of Ins. v. Banker's Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6 (1971), and
Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128 (1972), and the public concern
with achieving fairness in the securities markets indicate that the parity-of-information
rule may ultimately emerge as the standard. In Birdman v. Electro-Catheter Corp.,
CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 11 93,934 (E.D. Pa. 1973), while discussing the failure to disclose
the potential market impact of the contemplated sale of shares by insiders, the court
came very close to a parity-of-information test in saying: "The omission of such information, if material, would thwart the basic policy of Rule IOb-5 ••• which is that all
investors have relatively equal access to material information." 11 93,934, at 93,725-26,
Other cases that, although distinguishable on their facts, may be said to accept the
parity-of-information principle are SEC v. Great Am. Indus., 407 F.2d 453 (2d
Cir. 1968) (concurring opinion); Landy v. FDIC, CCH FED, SEC. L. REP. 11 94,094 (3d
Cir. 1973); Courtland v. Walston &: Co., 340 F. Supp. 1076 (S.D.N.Y. 1972). The parity•
of-information test accords with present day expectations. When rule IOb-5 was
adopted, the public had not yet been invited in. The market consisted of professionals,
~semipros, and those who liked to think of themselves as semipros. The vast majority
of people "in the market" did not expect parity of market information. At most, they
expected not to be defrauded by insiders with knowledge of material changes in things
like earnings or dividends. After the public was invited in, expectations changed. The
public expects evenhanded fairness and does not distinguish losses arising out of nondisclosure of market information from those arising out of nondisclosure of corporate
information. It is evident today that the Congress and the SEC are responding to this
public expectation, and the courts may do likewise. In tbis connection, Crane Co. v,
Westinghouse Air Brake Co., 419 F.2d 787 (2d Cir. 1969), should be kept in mind, ln
finding a rule IOb-5 violation in failure to disclose the offeror's market activities in the
target company's stock, the court felt constrained to find an "insider'' relationship, The
court "reasoned" that the tender offeror was an "insider" with respect to the trading in
the target's stock even though such information peculiarly concerned the tender offeror
and not the target. As in many judicial developments, the courts may reach parity-of.
information results before the principle itself is fully recognized and adopted.
A recent White Paper, COMPANY LAw REForo.r, Cor.lND. No. 5391, at 8 (1973), contains an excellent statement of the philosophy of the parity-of-information principle:
Unfair profits can on occasion be made in share dealings by the improper use
of confidential, price-sensitive information that is not generally available to the
investing public. This is prima facie most likely to happen in a bid, or expected
bid, situation, but in principle it can happen at any time. The efficient operation
of the market as a source of capital, as a measure of industrial success and hence
as a means of achieving a desirable and efficient disposition of resources, requires
that relevant information should be fairly available, and that all investors should
be able to back their knowledge and judgment rather than that favoured individuals should be able to take private advantage of confidential information. These

December 1973)

Recent Books

365

are involved. Proposed rule 13e-2,27 regarding corporate repurchase
programs, is a good analogy. If a buying program is not likely and
the buyer does not intend to affect the market price, disclosure
should not be required. However, if market conditions or the buyer's
intentions are such that it knows, or reasonably should know, that
its transactions will have a material effect on the market price, there
is a substantial question as to whether disclosure should be required.
Having rejected both integration and rule lOb-5 disclosure in
connection with preannouncement open-market purchases, Aranow
and Einhorn do not face the difficult issues of when it is appropriate
to apply the integration concept and what is material information in
this context. In most situations, the buyer's intention is not formulated at the time of the initial purchases. Rather, the buyer generally tests the market, determines the dimensions of the buying program, and then decides whether or not to make a tender offer on the
basis of "how the market acts." This creates a question of fact as to
the buyer's real intention at the time of the initial purchases or,
assuming that the buyer's intention was fluid, a question as to the
materiality of the information that a buyer who might make a tender
offer is testing the market. Where open market purchases are made
without any intention to make a tender offer and the investor subsequently changes its mind and decides to make a tender offer, the
open-market purchases should not be integrated with the later offer.
Aranow and Einhorn also do not treat specifically another of the
most intriguing questions under the Williams Act-open-market purchases by a third party to defeat a tender offer. A possible scenario
is: Target, listed on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), has
2,000,000 shares outstanding. Target stock has recently been trading
at twenty dollars per share. Offeror makes the requisite filing under
the Williams Act and announces a tender offer for all Target shares
at twenty-six dollars per share, conditioned on obtaining not less
than 1,000,000 shares. The price of Target on the NYSE goes to
twenty-five and one quarter. The next day, Competitor, without any
prior disclosure or announcement of its intentions, commences to
purchase Target shares on the NYSE; it intends to buy 1,000,000
requirements have so far been fulfilled by the application of the rules of the Stock
Exchange and, in bid situations, by the Take-Over Panel. Without implying that
malpractice bas been widespread, the Government have concluded that it is necessary for the voluntary system to be reinforced by statute so as to ensure, as far as
practically possible, that the market operates freely on the basis of equality
be~veen buyer and seller. Care must of course be taken to avoid unduly inhibiting
the flexibility of the market. But the general desirability of ensuring equality of
information to all potential or actual investors, and hence a proper disposition of
the resources available to those investors, must have a high priority. The successful operation of the system demands a high degree of confidence in fair
dealing on the Stock Exchange, and indeed in securities generally, whether or not
publicly quoted.
27. SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8930 Uuly 13, 1970), 2 CCH
L. REP, 1J 26,854 (1970).

FED.

SEC.
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shares and thereby defeat Offeror's bid and gain control of Target
for itself. After buying 500,000 shares at prices between twenty-five
and one half and twenty-six and one eighth, Competitor issues a
press release that states its intention to continue to buy Target shares
until it has 1,000,000 shares. During the next few days, Competitor buys the other 500,000 shares at prices between twenty-five
and one half and twenty-six and one half. All of Competitor's purchases are in transactions on the floor of the NYSE by a broker continuously bidding on behalf of Competitor and continuously accepting all offers at its current bid. Competitor does not in any way
(other than through its press release) communicate directly with
Target shareholders. Competitor does not file under the Williams
Act until after it has completed all of its purchases. It then files,
within the specified ten-day period, a schedule 13D.28 Following
Competitor's press release, a number of brokers voluntarily contact
Target shareholders to advise them to sell immediately because
Offeror's bid appears to be defeated and the brokers expect the price
of Target to return to twenty when Competitor completes its buying program. A number of market professionals reach the same conclusion and decide that making short sales of Target stock to Competitor is a "sure thing" in that, when Competitor stops buying
after accumulating 1,000,000 shares as announced, they will be able
to cover at lower prices.29 The number of shares tendered to Offeror
falls far short of 1,000,000, and it terminates its offer and returns all
shares tendered. The market price of Target drops to the pre-tender
offer level.
Without making prior announcement, and without complying
with the Williams Act, Competitor, using the umbrella of Offeror's
bid (Offeror, having announced a tender offer, was precluded by
rule IOb-13 from buying on the floor of the NYSE in competition
with Competitor), was able to acquire 1,000,000 shares of Target
and defeat Offeror. In so doing, Competitor did not accord potential
sellers pro rata treatment and did not disclose its future plans for
Target-but did afford market professionals the opportunity for a
speedy short-sale profit. The real victims of Competitor's unregulated buying program were the unsophisticated public shareholders
of Target who were unable to act fast enough to sell to Competitor
at twenty-six plus. These shareholders, unable to obtain the twentysix dollar tender offer price from Offeror and not appreciating the
temporary nature of the increase in market price above Offeror's
offer, were left with shares at a market value substantially less than
28. 17 C.F.R. § 240.I3d-101 (1973).
29. Announcement of a third offer for all Target shares at a price higher than 26
or an increase in Offerer's bid is the only danger faced by the short seUers, and this is

unlikely after Competitor has already acquired more than 25 per cent of the outstanding shares.
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the trading prices that prevailed during Competitor's buying program.
Clearly Competitor's action resulted in unfairness and injury to
the public shareholders of Target. The only question is whether such
action is remediable under the federal securities laws-whether the
conduct of Competitor violated the Williams Act, as well as rules
l0b-5 and IOb-13. Notwithstanding the Aranow and Einhorn position on creeping tender offers and the 1973 cases that refuse to outlaw open-market purchases as tender offers, if the purposes of the
Williams Act are to be achieved, large-scale open-market purchases
to obtain control should be held to be tender offers. Where such
purchases are made for the purpose of defeating another's tender
offer, the argument for finding them to be a tender offer is compelling. To hold that these purchases are not tender offers is to
handicap severely the person making the formal tender offer in
compliance with the Williams Act and to subject the public shareholders to the disadvantages that the Williams Act was intended to
remedy.30 In addition, independent of the question of the definition
of a tender offer, such purchases should also be held to violate rule
14d-4,31 which requires compliance with the Williams Act disclosure
provisions by those attempting to defeat tender offers.
Despite its unfortunate cutoff date and its summary treatment
of a few points, Tender Offers for Corporate Control is a significant
contribution to the literature on securities regulation. It is a handy
starting place and a good research resource in the tender offer field.
No well-rounded library should be without it.

Martin Lipton,
Member, New York Bar,
Adjunct Professor of Law,
New York University
30. See Note, The Developing Meaning of "Tender Offer'' under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 86 HARv. L. REY. 1250, 1275 (1973), in which it is suggested that
the appropriate basis on which to determine what is a tender offer is the impact on
the shareholders of the target; if the effect is substantially the same as a conventional
tender offer, it is a "tender offer." The American Law Institute's proposed Federal
Securities Code would define a "tender request" in terms of an offer to more than 35
persons, without regard to the manner of the offer. ALI FED. SEC. CoDE § 299.9 (Tent.
Draft No. I, 1972).
31. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-4 (1973),

